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Michael K. Reer† and Valerie Antonette†† 
 
I. RECENT OIL AND GAS ACTIVITY IN PENNSYLVANIA1 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Pennsylvania ranked second among states in production of natural gas 
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 1. Unless otherwise noted, this article is limited to September 1, 2019 through 
September 1, 2020.  
 2. Pennsylvania Profile Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
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number of unconventional permit applications received by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“PADEP”) 
remains relatively robust, the number of unconventional well 
applications continues to decline from the peak of 3,182 received in 
2014.3 In 2019, PADEP received 1,475 unconventional permit 
applications, as compared to 1,868 in 2018 and 2,028 in 2017.  
II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 
On November 7, 2019, Governor Tom Wolf signed Act 85 of 2019 
(previously S.B. 694), Oil and Gas Lease Act–Cross Unit Drilling for 
Unconventional Wells. Act 85 provides that if an operator has the right 
to drill an oil or gas well on separate units, the operator may (under 
certain circumstances) drill and produce a well that traverses, by 
horizontal drilling, more than one unit.4  
If the operator elects to drill across units pursuant to Act 85, the 
operator must reasonably allocate production from the cross-unit well 
to or among each unit containing the well.5 Act 85 permits the operator 
to allocate production on an acreage basis for multiple units provided 
the allocation has a reasonable correlation to the portion of the 
horizontal well in each unit.6 The operator may not elect cross-unit 
development if the terms of an applicable lease expressly prohibit such 
development.7 
Act 85 excepts the portion of the lateral crossing the unit boundary 
from the Oil and Gas Conservation Law 330-foot setback 
requirement.8 Finally, Act 85 provides that nothing in the Act 
authorizes an operator to drill an oil or gas well that is not subject to a 
valid lease or royalty agreement and that nothing in the Act 
automatically expands or diminishes the current surface rights of an 
operator to include operations related to any existing unit or any well 




 3. 2019 Oil and Gas Annual Report, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, 
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/3f99825a393d4fe080d6d1c8e74b6f34 
[https://perma.cc/B9YC-W7KL] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
 4. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 34.2(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess. Act 79). 
 5. Id. § 34.2(a). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. § 34.2(b). 
 9. Id. § 34.2(c).  
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III. OIL AND GAS LITIGATION 
In the past year, the federal district courts and Commonwealth 
appellate courts issued significant decisions concerning oil and gas 
title and lease issues.  
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Issues Decision on Trespass by 
Hydraulic Fracturing 
In January 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania released a 
highly anticipated opinion concerning the possibility of trespass by 
hydraulic fracturing. In Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production 
Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “the rule of capture 
remains extant in Pennsylvania, and developers who use hydraulic 
fracturing may rely on pressure differentials to drain oil and gas from 
under another’s property, at least in the absence of a physical 
invasion.”10 
The pleadings and facts alleged in Briggs are somewhat peculiar. 
Notably, the plaintiff in Briggs did not allege in the pleadings, 
summary judgment briefing, or in the appellate proceedings at the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court that the defendant (Southwestern) used 
hydraulic fracturing to physically intrude on the property at issue.11 
Instead, the plaintiff contended that shale gas is non-migratory in 
nature, and therefore the traditional rule of capture did not apply to 
hydraulic fracturing intended to produce shale gas.12 
The Court first held that it “reject[ed] as a matter of law the concept 
that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely 
because drainage of natural resources takes place as the direct or 
indirect result of hydraulic fracturing or that such drainage stems from 
less natural means than conventional drainage.”13 The Court then held 
that there was no evidence in the record “that drainage from under a 
plaintiff’s parcel can only occur if the driller first physically invades 
the property.”14 
Significantly, the Court did not address a separate argument 
advanced by Southwestern: that “trespass should not be viewed as 
occurring miles beneath the surface of the earth” because “in some 
 
 10. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334, 352 (Pa. 2020). 
 11. See id. at 344, 345. 
 12. Id. at 344. 
 13. Id. at 348–49. 
 14. Id. at 349. 
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jurisdictions traditional concepts of physical trespass have been 
relaxed where activities take place miles below the surface, and the 
plaintiff is not deprived of the use and enjoyment of the land.”15 In 
choosing not to address the issue, the Court noted that Southwestern 
failed to correctly preserve the argument for review.16 This 
unaddressed argument may reappear either in subsequent briefing in 
Briggs (which the Court remanded) or in another action, given its 
favorable treatment in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy 
Trust.17 
B. Superior Court Clarifies Ostensible Agency Principles 
In Wiedenhoft v. Chief Exploration & Development, LLC, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court considered the application of ostensible 
agency principles where a lessee used a land brokerage firm to lease 
acreage in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.  
Specifically, the lessor-plaintiffs alleged that a landman from a 
brokerage company showed the plaintiffs a brochure from the lessee-
operator, the landman represented that he had authority to negotiate a 
lease on behalf of the lessee-operator, and the landman induced the 
lessor-plaintiffs to sign a form lease with the promise that the lessor-
plaintiffs’ lawyer could later draft and attach an addendum to the form 
lease (subject to final approval by the lessee-operator).18 
Subsequently, the lease was recorded (without any addendum), and 
the lessee-operator took the position that the lease was valid and could 
not be amended.19 The lessor-plaintiffs brought suit against both the 
land brokerage firm and the lessee-operator alleging, among other 
 
 15. Id. at 350.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 
2008) (“Had Coastal caused something like proppants to be deposited on the surface 
of Share 13, it would be liable for trespass, and from the ancient common law maxim 
that land ownership extends to the sky above and the earth’s center below, one might 
extrapolate that the same rule should apply two miles below the surface. But that 
maxim—cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos—has no place in the 
modern world. Wheeling an airplane across the surface of one’s property without 
permission is a trespass; flying the plane through the airspace two miles above the 
property is not. Lord Coke, who pronounced the maxim, did not consider the 
possibility of airplanes. But neither did he imagine oil wells. The law of trespass 
need no more be the same two miles below the surface than two miles above.”). 
 18. Wiedenhoft v. Chief Expl. & Dev., LLC, No. 910 WDA 2019, 2020 WL 
3057989, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 8, 2020) (non-precedential). 
 19. Id.  
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things, that the landman was an ostensible agent of the lessee-
operator.20 
The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs, 
finding that the plaintiffs supplied no direct or circumstantial evidence 
of an agency relationship between the landman and lessee.21 On 
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that they had presented evidence of an 
agency relationship through their testimony of the actions and 
representations made by the landman.22 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the attempt to apply 
principles of ostensible agency to a suit for economic damages caused 
by intentional torts of an independent contractor:23  
 
However, such principles of ostensible agency have 
only been applied in Pennsylvania to impose liability 
upon one who utilizes the services of an independent 
contractor for personal injuries caused by the 
negligence of the independent contractor . . . The 
Wiedenhofts offer no argument or authority to suggest 
that ostensible agency principles may be utilized to 
impose liability on Chief for their economic damages 
caused by the intentional torts of an independent 
contractor.24 
 
Accordingly, the superior court held that evidence of ostensible 
agency could not be used to establish vicarious liability and upheld the 
trial court grant of summary judgment.25 
C. Superior Court Considers Malpractice Claim Related to Title-
Bust 
In Bastin v. Bassi, the superior court considered a legal malpractice 
claim in the context of an allegedly inaccurate title run sheet. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs executed a provisional oil and gas lease 
with a lessee, which was subsequently defected because of a 
preexisting and continuing lease executed by the plaintiffs’ 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at *3. 
 24. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 25. Id. at *3–4. 
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predecessor-in-interest.26 The plaintiffs alleged that they hired an 
attorney to issue a title report prior to the purchase of the property at 
issue and that the title report contained no reference to the preexisting 
lease.27 Even taking the plaintiffs’ claims as true,28 the superior court 
found that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm, the loss of a lease bonus, was 
not the proximate cause of the alleged breach, an omission on the title 
report.29 In other words, the superior court found that the loss of the 
lease bonus was the result of the preexisting oil and gas lease and not 
the result of any act or omission of the attorney.30  
D. Superior Court Holds Overriding Royalty Interests Subject to 
Recording Statute 
In Hayward v. LPR Energy, the superior court considered the 
application of the Commonwealth’s recording statute to a reservation 
of certain overriding royalty interests in Clearfield County. In 
Hayward, a geologist and landman assembled oil and gas leases within 
a prospective 13,000 acre mineral development area and then granted 
the leases to an operator, reserving a 3.125% overriding royalty 
interest (“ORRI”).31 Assignments concerning approximately 2,000 
acres of the prospective development referenced the ORRI 
reservation, and assignments concerning the other 11,000 acres merely 
referenced “an executed and unrecorded agreement” between the 
geologist and the assignee.32 The geologist and landman brought suit 
against a successor-in-interest to the assignee to enforce the ORRIs, 
and the trial court granted judgment against the geologist and landman 
as to the 11,000 acres.33 
The superior court agreed with the trial court, holding that the 
Commonwealth recording statute (which effectuates a “race-notice” 
scheme) required the geologist and landman to record their ORRI 
 
 26. Bastin v. Bassi, No. 682 WDA 2019, 2019 WL 6840606, at *1 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 16, 2019). 
 27. Id. at *2. 
 28. Id. The Superior Court’s opinion demonstrates significant skepticism that the 
attorney was engaged to conduct a title examination of the property at issue.   
 29. Id. at *3. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Hayward v. LPR Energy, LLC, No. 794 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 7388588, at 
*1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2019). 
 32. Id. at *3. At trial, the geologist testified that the decision to not record the 
details of the ORRI on the 11,000 acre assignments was purposeful, and part of an 
effort to avoid educating other geologists and landmen about the prospect. 
 33. Id. at *5. 
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interest.34 Because the geologist and landman failed to record their 
interest before the successors-in-interest to the assignee took title and 
recorded notice thereof, the geologist and landman were not first-in-
time to record.35 The court rejected the argument that the reference to 
“an executed and unrecorded agreement” should have placed the 
assignee’s successor-in-interest on constructive notice of the ORRIs.36 
Among other reasons, the court determined that the argument would, 
if accepted, effectuate the complete opposite of the intent of the 
recording statute by allowing parties to give “constructive notice” of 
interests not actually in the public record.37 
E. Commonwealth Court Considers Zoning Issues 
In the past year, the commonwealth court issued three opinions in 
cases that concern oil and gas zoning issues.38 In the first case, Protect 
PT challenged the substantive validity of a 2016 zoning ordinance in 
Penn Township, which established a Rural Resource District with a 
Mineral Extraction Overlay that permitted unconventional natural gas 
development in low-density residential areas.39 Protect PT challenged 
the validity of the zoning ordinance through the Environmental Rights 
Amendment in Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
arguing that the zoning ordinance would allow “heavy industrial 
activity” in a “growing suburban community.”40 
Among other protections, the zoning ordinance at issue prohibited 
wastewater impoundments, set minimum setbacks for property lines 
and protected structures, reserved the right to add further conditions 
on development through the special exception process, and required 
the operator to demonstrate that development would not violate the 
Environmental Rights Amendment. The operator must demonstrate 
this through reports from “qualified environmental individuals,” to 
submit air modeling, and to submit hydrological studies concerning 
 
 34. Id. at *9, 11. The Court also determined that ORRIs are real property 
interests in Pennsylvania, and not only contractual.  
 35. Id. at *9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174 (Pa. Cmmw. 
Ct. 2019); Protect PT v. Penn Twp.  Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 575 C.D. 2019, 2020 
WL 3640001 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. July 6, 2020); Protect PT v. Penn Twp.  Zoning 
Hearing Bd., No. 576 C.D. 2019, 2020 WL 3639998 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. July 6, 2020). 
 39. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174, 1177 (Pa. 
Cmmw. Ct. 2019). 
 40. Id. 
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potential pathways that a spill or release would flow.41 The zoning 
ordinance was the result of some nineteen planning commission 
meetings, fifty-three commissioners’ meetings, two public meetings, 
and a town hall event.42 
In upholding the trial court’s determination that the zoning 
ordinance passed constitutional muster, the commonwealth court 
specifically addressed several arguments advanced by Protect PT. 
First, the commonwealth court rejected the argument that the trial 
court committed reversible error by failing to consider pre-production 
phases of unconventional development, such as excavation, 
construction, drilling, and completion as part of the “zoning 
analysis.”43 While cautioning that the “better jurisprudential 
articulation is that impacts from any stage can be taken into 
consideration by the fact-finder in a substantive validity analysis,” the 
commonwealth court found “no reversible error” because “zoning 
regulates the use of the land, not the particulars of development and 
construction.”44 
Second, the commonwealth court rejected the Protect PT argument 
that the zoning ordinance was deficient because it was inconsistent 
with the township comprehensive plan.45 Per the Commonwealth 
Municipal Planning Code, “no action by the governing body of a 
municipality shall be invalid or be subject to challenge on appeal on 
the basis that such action is inconsistent with or fails to comply with 
the provisions of a comprehensive plan.”46 
Third, the commonwealth court rejected the Protect PT argument 
that the zoning ordinance violated the Commonwealth’s 
Environmental Rights Amendment.47 In discussing the Environmental 
Rights Amendment, the commonwealth court favorably cited a 
decision by the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board in The 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Department of Environmental 
Protection & R.E. Gas Development, LLC,: 
 
In that case, the EHB articulated a two-step process for 
determining compliance with the ERA. The first step 
involves an evaluation of whether the environmental 
 
 41. Id. at 1179. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1189. 
 44. Id. at 1189, 1191–92. 
 45. See id. at 1192–95. 
 46. Id. at 1194–95. 
 47. Id. at 1197. 
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impacts of the action were considered and whether 
there was a correct determination that the action would 
not result in unreasonable degradation, diminution, 
depletion, or deterioration of the environment. The 
second step involves an evaluation of whether the 
government entity fulfilled its responsibilities as a 
trustee under the ERA by acting with prudence, loyalty, 
and impartiality with respect to the beneficiaries of the 
natural resources impacted by the action. 
 
The commonwealth court noted that the zoning ordinance expressly 
required the operator to demonstrate compliance with the 
Environmental Rights Amendment before approval of a special 
exception48 and held that Protect PT failed to show with credible 
evidence that unconventional development would unreasonably 
impair the rights of the township residents.49 The court also 
commented that the Environmental Rights Amendment “does not 
impose express duties on municipalities to enact specific affirmative 
measures to promote clean air, pure water, and the preservation of 
different value of our environment.”50 
In Protect PT II and Protect PT III, the commonwealth court 
rejected Environmental Rights Amendment challenges to special 
exceptions related to unconventional development that Penn 
Township granted.51 Among other reasons, the court held that 
constitutional challenges to the special exception were not proper 
because the “proposed unconventional gas well operations [were] 
permitted by special exception . . . , which evidences a legislative 
decision that the uses [were] consistent with the zoning plan and 
 
 48. See Protect PT v. Penn Twp.  Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 575 C.D. 2019, 2020 
WL 3640001, at *5 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. July 6, 2020) (“A special exception is neither 
special nor an exception, but rather a use expressly contemplated that evidences a 
legislative decision that the particular type of use is consistent with the zoning plan 
and presumptively consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the 
community.”). 
 49. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174, 1197–98 (Pa. 
Cmmw. Ct. 2019) 
 50. Id. at 1198.  
 51. See Protect PT v. Penn Twp.  Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 575 C.D. 2019, 2020 
WL 3640001, at *14 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. July 6, 2020); see also Protect PT v. Penn 
Twp.  Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 576 C.D. 2019, 2020 WL 3639998, at *5 (Pa. 
Cmmw. Ct. July 6, 2020) 
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presumptively consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community.”52  
F. Pennsylvania and Federal Courts Address Delay Rental Issues 
In 2020, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued two decisions 
concerning the effect of delay rental payments on oil and gas lease 
termination.53 In Barton, the lessee attempted to use a delay rental 
provision to save a lease with one well that “ha[d] not produced any 
gas since June 1993,” was “disconnected from any tanks or 
commercial distribution systems for the sale of gas, and [was] 
overgrown and surrounded by trees, brush, and saplings.”54 The court 
rejected the lessor’s argument that indefinite delay rental payments, 
after the expiration of the primary term, could prevent termination of 
the lease and instead found that the lease expired by its own terms once 
production ceased and the habendum clause was no longer satisfied.55 
Conversely, in Wilson, the Pennsylvania Superior Court enforced a 
delay rental savings provision in an oil and gas lease.56 The delay 
rental savings provision provided compensation to the lessors of $3.00 
per acre per year that drilling was delayed.57 The lessors accepted 
delay rental payments for seven years, after which the lessee began 
operations on the leasehold.58 In holding that the delay rental 
payments saved the lease from terminating, the superior court noted 
that the lessors “accepted annual delay rental payments, which 
purported to extend the leases under their agreements’ terms.”59 
In Northeast Natural Energy LLC v. Larson, the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to vacate an 
arbitration award in a delay rental case. The lease at issue provided 
that the “[l]essee shall pay to [the l]essor a minimum amount equal to 
[$250] per acre of leased premise, during the primary term of this 
[l]ease, for the privilege of delaying commencement of drilling 
operations” and that the “[l]essee, at any time . . . may surrender this 
 
 52. Protect PT v. Penn Twp.  Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 575 C.D. 2019, 2020 WL 
3640001, at *14 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. July 6, 2020). 
 53. Wilson v. Snyder Brothers, Inc., 232 A.3d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020); Barton 
v. Graham, No. 1704 WDA 2018, 2020 WL 1488440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (non-
precedential).  
 54. Barton, 2020 WL 1488440, at *1.  
 55. Id. at *7. 
 56. Wilson, 232 A.3d at 878. 
 57. Id. at 874. 
 58. Id. at 877. 
 59. Id.  
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lease as to all or part thereof . . . and thereupon this lease and the rights, 
rentals and obligations of the parties hereunder shall terminate as to 
the part so surrendered.”60 The arbitration panel determined that 
surrender did not terminate the obligation to pay delay rentals because 
the lessor had a “vested right to payment,” and the district court agreed 
that the “record supports this interpretation of the [l]eases and adheres 
to principles of contract interpretation.”61 
G. Commonwealth Court Denies Summary Judgment in Proctor 
Heirs/Game Commission Dispute 
In Commonwealth v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Trust, the 
commonwealth court denied competing motions for summary 
judgment filed by the Proctor Heirs Trust and the Pennsylvania Game 
Commission. The lawsuit resulted from a Game Commission quiet 
title action and concerned approximately 59,000 acres previously 
owned by Thomas E. Proctor, which he conveyed to the Elk Tanning 
Company in 1894—expressly reserving a right to the natural gas.62 
The Elk Tanning Company conveyed the surface to the Central 
Pennsylvania Lumber Company (“CPLC”) subject to the Proctor 
reservation.63 The surface warrant at issue was purchased twice at 
Lycoming County tax sales (once in 1908 and once in 1924) and each 
time quitclaimed back to CPLC.64  
The Game Commission contended that each tax sale effectively 
washed the title of the Proctor severance by operation of the Act of 
1806.65 The Act of 1806 effects a limited subset of cases involving 
quiet title actions for formerly unseated lands sold at tax sales prior to 
1947.66 Generally, the Act of 1806 requires any person who became a 
holder of unseated land to provide notice to the county commissioners 
of the transfer of ownership.67 In Herder Spring Hunting Club v. 
Keller, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “if a purchaser 
of unseated land failed to report a severance to the county 
 
 60. N.E. Nat. Energy LLC v. Larson, 3:18-CV-240, 2019 WL 4575845, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2019).  
 61. Id. at *5.  
 62. Pennsylvania v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., 493 M.D. 2017, 2020 WL 
256984, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct.  
Jan. 16, 2020). 
 63. Id. at *2. 
 64. Id. at *2–3. 
 65. Id. at *4.  
 66. Id. at *5. 
 67. Id. at *4. 
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commissioners, a subsequent tax sale would effectively ‘wash’ the 
title of the severance and vest the tax sale purchaser with all right, title, 
and interest in both the surface and the subsurface rights, as if the 
severance had never occurred.”68 The Court also stated that “absent 
proof to the contrary” Pennsylvania courts may presume that the entire 
property continued to be assessed, taxed, and sold as a whole.69 
The commonwealth court found that two fact issues precluded the 
grant of summary judgment.70 First, the Proctor Heirs Trust submitted 
evidence that their predecessors-in-interest “declared or reported their 
interests” in the subsurface to the County Commissioners of 
Lycoming County.71 Second, the commonwealth court determined 
that a fact issue existed as to whether the tax sale “purchasers” were 
agents of CPLC, which (depending on the specifics of the agency and 
the tax sale purchase) could have made the tax sale purchases the 
functional equivalent of redemptions—thereby restoring the separate 
ownership interests in each of the surface and subsurface.72 
H. Federal Courts Find Leasehold Value Satisfies Amount-in-
Controversy Requirement 
Both the Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania issued 
opinions concerning the proper method for valuing oil and gas leases 
with respect to the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity 
jurisdiction.73 In Kopko, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to remand a complaint 
seeking recession of an oil and gas lease. In short, the complaint 
averred that the lessee-landman (who was an attorney) took advantage 
of a prior attorney-client relationship with the lessor to convince the 
lessor to accept lease terms that were below market rates. The 
complaint stated that the lessee-landman then misrepresented that the 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at *5.  
 70. Id. at *7–8. 
 71. Id. at *7. The Commonwealth Court also noted the Game Commission 
argument that the record contained no evidence that the Proctor Heirs predecessors-
in-interest ever reported the severance, such that the severed minerals could be 
assessed and taxed separately. 
 72. Id. at *8. The Proctor Heirs presented evidence that, instead of paying taxes, 
the CPLC allowed its properties to be “sold” at tax sale, only to have its agents 
purchase and redeem the properties, and quitclaim them back to CPLC. 
 73. Kopko v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, 2:20-CV-00423-MJH, 2020 WL 
3496277, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2020) (mem. op.); Earnshaw v. Chesapeake 
Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 3:19-CV-1479, 2019 WL 6839305, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 
16, 2019) (mem. op.). 
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lease could not be canceled or changed within ninety days of execution 
(even though the lease provided otherwise).74  
The lessee moved to remand the complaint to the Court of Common 
Pleas on the basis that the equitable remedy of rescission did not 
exceed the amount-in-controversy requirement of $75,000.75 In 
denying the motion to remand, the court noted that “[i]n the context of 
oil and gas leases, courts have held that the value of the lease in toto 
determines the jurisdictional amount even when [the] plaintiff seeks 
only equitable relief” and that it was uncontested that the lessor 
received a bonus of $176,550 and royalties of approximately $155,386 
under the lease.76 The court also granted the lessee’s motion to dismiss 
the claims, applying the Commonwealth’s two-year statute of 
limitation for fraud-based claims, which would bar claims brought in 
2019 for fraud that allegedly occurred in 2008.77 
Similarly, in Earnshaw, the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania determined the amount in controversy 
requirement was satisfied where the landowner alleged that a 
horizontal wellbore entered the property at issue without a valid 
lease.78 The operator submitted declarations from employees 
demonstrating that the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold was 
met several different ways, including through the aggregate amount of 
royalties the landowner received, the amount of damages the 
landowner sought, the cost to complete specific performance, and the 
value that the operator would lose in completing the specific 
performance.79 
I. Middle District Construes Implied Covenant Obligations 
The Middle District of Pennsylvania recently issued three opinions 
that concerned the implied covenant obligations of lessees.80 In 
Sargent, the Middle District considered a motion to dismiss a claim 
 
 74. Kopko v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, 2:20-CV-00423-MJH, 2020 WL 
3514075, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2020). 
 75. Kopko, 2020 WL 3496277, at *1. 
 76. Id. at *2.  
 77. Kopko, 2020 WL 3514075, at *2. 
 78. Earnshaw , 2019 WL 6839305, at *1. 
 79. Id. at *3.  
 80. See Sargent v. SWEPI LP, No. 4:19-CV-1896, 2020 WL 1503222 (M.D. Pa. 
Mar. 23, 2020); Hordis v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:19-CV-296, 2020 WL 
2128968 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2020); Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., No. 3:19-CV-1303, 
2020 WL 1663342 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2020). 
  
450 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.81 In 
granting the motion to dismiss, the court held that the plaintiff’s failure 
to allege an independent breach of the terms of the relevant leases 
“proves fatal” because, among other reasons, the implied covenant 
cannot overcome the express terms of an agreement.82 
Likewise, in Hordis, the Middle District reached a similar result, 
holding that breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing supplies an independent claim for breach of contract “only in 
very narrow circumstances.”83 Instead, the Middle District posited that 
the implied covenant “informs the meaning of existing terms but 
cannot supply new ones.” In other words, the implied covenant “helps 
the court to harmonize the reasonable expectation of the parties” as 
they pertain to the express terms of the agreement.84 However, the 
Hordis court cautioned that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not 
directly answered the question of whether a breach of the implied 
covenant can independently support a cause of action sounding in 
contract.85 
Finally, in Diehl, the Middle District considered the implied 
covenants to market and develop in the context of a motion to 
dismiss.86 The court denied the lessee’s motion to dismiss the lessor’s 
claims for breach of implied covenant to market because the lessor 
alleged that the lessee sold production to an affiliate for below-market 
rates.87 Conversely, the court undertook a narrow interpretation of the 
implied covenant to develop, holding that Pennsylvania courts have 
“consistently concluded that an implied duty to develop was not 
applicable or was not breached when the lessor was not holding the 
property without developing it—where development had commenced 
it was the express terms of the lease that controlled.”88 
 
 81. Sargent, 2020 WL 1503222, at *2. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Hordis, 2020 WL 2128968, at *5. 
 84. Id. at *4. 
 85. 2020 WL 2128968, at *4. 
 86. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342 (M.D. Pa. 
Apr. 3, 2020). 
 87. Id. at *5. 
 88. Id. at *12; see also id. at *14 (quoting that “Here, the lease does not contain 
express terms related to the number of wells to be drilled or other specific aspects of 
development, but the parties agreed upon what shall be done in terms of the 
development needed to hold the lease in the habendum clause.”). 
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J. Middle District Defines the “Due Diligence” Requirement 
In Butters v. SWN Production Co., LLC, the Middle District denied 
a motion for summary judgment concerning a lease with a habendum 
clause that provided, among other things, that the lease remained in 
full force and effect so long as “drilling operations continue with due 
diligence . . . .” The lessee contended that the due diligence provision 
in the habendum clause should be interpreted within the business 
judgment rule and that the clause was satisfied so long as the lessee 
did not act “in bad faith or fraudulently.”89 In denying the motion for 
summary judgment, and in determining that whether the lessee acted 
with due diligence was a fact issue, the court held that “due diligence” 
should be interpreted consistent with the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of the term—”the diligence reasonably expected from, and 
ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal 
requirement or to discharge an obligation.”90 
K. Western District Denies Request for Accounting 
In Pflasterer v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, the Western 
District denied a request for an equitable accounting where a lessor 
alleged that a lessee miscalculated royalty payments. The district court 
noted that under Pennsylvania law, an equitable accounting is 
generally only available in the instance of a fiduciary relationship 
where there are allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, no adequate 
remedy at law exists, or the lessee refuses the lessor the opportunity to 
inspect the lessee’s books or records.91 
L. Middle District Considers Necessary Parties Defense 
In Kave Consulting, LLC v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the 
Middle District considered a lessee’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
join necessary parties. The plaintiffs owned a 50% interest in the 
property at issue, and their cotenants executed a lease with the lessee 
that yielded a royalty for a ten-year period.92 In filing an action for an 
 
 89. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., No. 4:17-CV-797, 2020 WL 1503657, at *7 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020) (mem. op.). 
 90. Id. at *8 (quoting Diligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004)). 
 91. Pflasterer v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-1437-SPB, 
2019 WL 4242057, at *6 (W.D. Pa.  
Sept. 6, 2019). 
 92. Kave Consulting, LLC v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 4:19-CV-
00196, 2019 WL 4687765, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
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accounting, the plaintiffs alleged that they did not consent to the 
production of oil and gas from the property at issue and that they had 
not been paid royalties for production.93 The lessee filed a motion to 
dismiss on the basis that the lessor-cotenants were necessary parties.94 
In denying the motion to dismiss, the court rejected the lessee’s 
arguments that the request for an accounting would put the lessee at 
risk of an inconsistent outcome in different forums and that the 
litigation would impede the ability of the unjoined cotenants to protect 
their interest in royalties already received from the lessee.95 
M. Federal Courts Consider Arbitration Issues 
Several federal decisions concerning arbitration issues may impact 
future claims brought by Pennsylvania lessors.96 In Marbarker, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether an 
arbitration provision allowed class-wide arbitration of royalty 
claims.97 In finding that the leases at issue did not allow for class-wide 
arbitration, the third circuit cautioned that courts “may not force 
parties to arbitrate unless they have consented to it.”  
 
Thus, courts will not force parties to submit to class 
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for 
concluding that the party agreed to do so. Contractual 
silence is not enough. Nor is contractual ambiguity. We 
will not infer consent. Rather, there must be an 
affirmative contractual basis for finding that the parties 
consented specifically to class arbitration.98 
 
The court also upheld the trial court determination that a declaratory 
judgment action seeking a declaration that the lessee waived their right 
to enforce certain arbitration clauses was not ripe until the lessee 
actually moved to compel arbitration.99 
 
 Sept. 26, 2019). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at *2.  
 96. See Marbarker v. Statoil USA Onshore Props., Inc., 801 F. App’x. 56 (3d 
Cir. 2020); Ostroski v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 2:18cv947, 2019 WL 
6118353 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2019) (mem. op.). 
 97. Marbarker, 801 F. App’x. at 60. 
 98. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 99. Id. at 59. 
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Likewise, in Ostroski, the Western District upheld an arbitration 
award, finding that royalties were properly calculated and paid at the 
wellhead where the lease required payment in the amount of “[one-
eighth] of the revenue realized by the [l]essee” and where the lessee 
sold the gas to their affiliate at the wellhead.100  
N. Middle District Certifies Royalty Class 
In Slamon v. Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC, the Middle District certified 
two classes of royalty owners. The first class consisted of royalty 
owners with leases that “expressly prohibit[ed] the deduction of post-
production expenses when calculating royalty amount due,” and the 
second class consisted of royalty owners with leases that provided for 
payment based on “the greater of the NYMEX spot price and/or the 
prevailing local market price, or the price at which gas is sold . . . .”101  
In certifying the classes, the court expressly rejected the argument 
that the Rule 23 commonality requirement could not be demonstrated 
because of “the number of variations in lease language.”102 Instead, 
the court cautioned that courts “have denied certification in cases only 
where the plaintiffs failed to examine all or a majority of the class 
leases and were unable to demonstrate common language.”103 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the next year, several additional appellate opinions regarding oil 
and gas lease issues are expected. Already, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court granted petitions for allowance of appeal in two cases expected 
to impact the oil and gas industry: SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well 
Energy, Inc., which concerns issues related to lease abandonment 
under a “drill or pay oil and gas lease;” and Commonwealth v. 
Chesapeake Energy Corp., which concerns conduct alleged to violate 
the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 




 100. Ostroski, 2019 WL 6118353, at *1, *3. 
 101. Slamon v. Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2187, 2020 WL 2525961, 
at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2020). 
 102. Id. at *11. 
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